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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellants' statement of the case, particularly 
the summary of the pleadings, omits several matters 
which should he briefly discussed before proceeding with 
the argument. The complaint is said to be in the ''usual 
form for an action to quiet title.'' Part of the prayer is 
mentioned and nothing more is said about it. There are 
several other allegations which should be noticed. It is 
alleged that the defendants, and each of them, assert and 
claim a right to use a portion of the plaintiff's land for 
roadways and for the purpose of loading and unloading 
merchandise from and upon railroad cars and trucks 
and that during or about 1934, certain defendants, with-
out the consent of the plaintiff, constructed a concrete 
ramp upon the southwestern portion of the real estate 
and that all of the defendants assert and claim the right 
to drive trucks and other vehicles over it and are making 
constant use of it wrongfully and in violation of the 
rights of the plaintiff. It is also alleged that unless the 
defendants are restrained by the court, and unless they 
are required to remove the concrete ramp and loading 
platform the trespas.ses will be frequent and repeated to 
the irreparable injury of the plaintiff. (Abs. 1-4.) 
The separate answers set up the ownership of land 
adjacent to the plaintiff's land and assert ownership of 
certain easements over and upon the plaintiff's land 
consisting of right of ways, the spur track, loading plat-
forms, wagon roads, team tracks, and other facilities by 
virtue of grants and reservations in certain deeds dated 
in 1923, and by implication. The defendants. specifically 
2_ 
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deny that they are trespassing upon or wrongfully using 
the plaintiff's land and that they have the right to use 
the loading platform, ramps and roadways. (Abs. 4-56.) 
The replies to the separate answers admit the execu-
tion and delivery of the various deeds from the common 
grantors and admit that when the said conveyances were 
made in 1923, there was situated upon the south part of 
plaintiff's property a spur track and a lumber platform 
approximately 10 feet wide and 75 feet long which was 
used for the purpose of loading and unloading mer-
chandise upon railroad cars, and that it remained the 
same until 1932 when certain of the defendants removed 
it and substituted a concrete ramp covering a much 
larger area. It is denied that the defendants have a 
right to use any of plaintiff's premises except a lumber 
platform 10 feet wide and 75 feet long attached to the 
building located in the northwest corner of Lot 2 and the 
railroad spur. (Abs. 56-75.) 
For the convenience of the court a diagram of the 
premises is attached to this brief. It is the same as 
Exhibit A except that it shows the size and location of 
the platform which the trial court found that the appeal-
ing defendants are entitled to maintain upon the plain-
tiff's land and also the location of the west door in the 
rear of the Colorado Animal By-Products Company ware-
house. This diagram shows the property ownership as 
of the date suit was commenced, the railroad spur and the 
concrete ramp. 
The evidence discloses that on August 9, 1923, Sey-
mour N. Bailey and his wife were owners of an undivided 
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one-half interest in the premises now owned by plaintiff, 
and Bert N. Bailey and wife were the owners of the other 
one-half interest. Seymour N. Bailey and his wife con-
veyed their interest to Bert N. Bailey by a deed dated 
August 9, 1923, and recorded on September 10, 1923, in 
Book 11-Q of deeds, page 586. (Exhibit J, Entry 37.) The 
original deed is not in evidence. The deed contains the 
following reservations : 
"Reserving, however, to the grantors the per-
petual right to the maintenance and use of the plat-
form now located on the Southern portion of said 
premises about ten feet wide including the over-
lapping roof for said platform including also the 
curve thereof along the railway spur as at present 
constructed, with full right to repair, reconstruct or 
rebuild the same within its pres.ent location. 
Also reserving the perpetual right to the use of 
the trackage over and along the South line of said 
premises and to the team truck or auto drive along 
the said track, all to be used in connection and for 
the convenience of Lot 2 of said Block for the load-
ing and unloading of merchandise. 
It is also hereby agreed that without the consent 
of Grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his assigns, that 
no right shall be granted for the use of said railway 
spur beyond the East end of said Lot 3. '' 
It will be noted that the words ''and to the premises'' 
do not appear after the word ''premises'' in the second 
paragraph, or anywhere in the deed. This is in1portant 
because much of the appellants' brief is predicated upon 
the meaning and significance of those words, and in 
numerous places in the brief it is argued that the find-
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ings and decree are ''false to the record'' because the 
words "and to the Premises" are omitted. 
On August 9, 1923, a deed from Bert N. Bailey and 
wife, and Seymour N. Bailey and wife conveyed to Bailey 
& Sons Company, certain land as follows: 
CONVEY AND \V ARRANT:-
Commencing at a point 83¥2 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 43, Plat "A,'' Salt 
Lake City Survey, thence North 10 rods; thence East 
25%, feet; thence South 10 rods; thence West 25% 
feet, to the place of beginning. 
Together with trackage privilege now in use at 
the North end of said property. 
Subject to 1923 taxes which grantees assume and 
agree to pay. 
Also, commencing at the Southwest corner of 
said Lot and Block, thence North 99¥2 feet; thence 
East 58"%, feet; thence South 99¥2 feet; thence West 
58"%, feet, to the place of beginning. 
Also a perpetual right to the use of the railroad 
spur together with the team, truck and auto drive 
along the North line thereof and the platform for 
loading and unloading from vehicles and cars, 
through and over a part of the South 1/2 of Lot 3, of 
said Block and Plat as at present constituted, with a 
right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the same a.s 
shall from time to time become necessary within its 
present location. 
Also a perpetual right of way for ingress, egress 
and regress for all purposes over the following strip 
of ground, to-wit: 
Commencing 99 feet East of the Northwest cor-
ner of said Lot 2, and running thence South 76 feet; 
thence West 40% feet; thence North 10¥2 feet; 
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thence East 30% feet; thence North 65¥2 feet; thence 
East 10 feet, to the place of beginning, to be kept 
open for loading and unloading goods, merchandise 
and other commodities from the platform along the 
South line of Lot 3, Block and Plat aforesaid, above 
referred to, together with the right of maintaining 
a cover or roof over said Platform at the North end 
of said right of way. 
This deed is given subject to a mortgage of 
$10,000.00 and interest from September 1, 1923. 
Also subject to the taxes for the year 1923, all of 
which grantees herein assume and agree to pay. 
Signed: Bert N. Bailey 
Leone Bailey 
Seymour N. Bailey 
Emma Z. Bailey 
(Exhibit J, Entry 50.) 
The foregoing is a full description of the land con-
veyed. The descriptions of the several parcels of land 
are omitted in the appellants' statement of facts. (App. 
Br. 5.) It will be noted that there is a separate reserva-
tion for each parcel conveyed. Thus, for the lot 23%, 
feet wide, described in the diagram attached to this brief, 
as Bailey & Sons property, a vacant lot, the only ease-
ment reserved is the trackage privilege as follows: 
''Together with the trackage privilege now in 
use at the North end of said property." 
ll,or the lot described as the Summerhays property 
the reservation is as follows: 
''Also a perpetual right to the use of the rail-
road spur together with the team, truck and auto 
drive along the North line thereof and the platform 
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for loading and unloading from vehicles and cars, 
through and over a part of the South lf~ of Lot 3, of 
said Block and Plat as at present constituted, with 
a right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the san1e as 
shall from time to time become necessary within its 
present location. 
Also a perpetual right of way for ingress, egress 
and regress for all purposes over the following strip 
of ground, to-wit : 
Commencing 99 feet East of the Northwest cor-
ner of said Lot 2, and running thence south 76 feet; 
thence West 403;{&, feet; thence N~orth lOlf2 feet; thence 
East 30%, feet; thence North 65lf2 feet; thence East 
10 feet, to the place of beginning, to be kept open 
for loading and unloading goods, merchandise and 
other commodities from the platform along the 
South line of Lot 3, Block and Plat aforesaid, above 
referred to, together with the right of maintaining 
a cover or roof over said platform at the North end 
of said right of way." (Exhibit J, Entry 50.) 
The latter part of the reservation refers to a tunnel 
or passageway wholly on Lot 2. 
At the time of the conveyances, Seymour and Bert 
Bailey owned the property now occupied by the defend-
ant, Colorado Animal By-Products Company; the prop-
erty owned by J. J. and C. E. Summerhays and occupied 
by J. W. Summerhays & Sons Company, the vacant lot 
25%, feet wide, the property occupied by the Valvoline 
Products Company, and the old Bailey building which is 
located upon the West 57.75 feet of the Scowcroft prop-
erty. The relative positions of these buildings may be 
readily ascertained for the purpose of this argument by 
an examination of the attached diagram, and the maps, 
Exhibits A and R prepared by E. H. Merrill, a practicing 
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engineer, showing the property in Lots 2 and 3 as of Jan-
nary 15, 1939 and as of August 9, 1923. 
The appellants, by their act in constructing, main-
taining and using the concrete ramp described in the 
pleadings, and as sketched in the attached diagram, have 
sought to extend their perpetual right to the use of the 
platform to such an extent that the concrete ramp which 
has replaced the lumber platform is in its widest p1ace 
approximately 56 feet and in its narrowest place is more 
than three times the width of the platform described in 
the deed. There is a retaining wall along the northern 
edge of the ramp one foot in thickness and extending a 
few inches above the concrete ramp itself. The evidence 
in this ca.se shows an utter and wanton disregard for the 
plaintiff's property rights. He was not even consulted 
before the ramp was constructed. 
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the size 
and location of the lumber platform referred to in the 
deeds. The appellants contended that the old lumber 
platform was 32 feet wide on its westerly edge and the 
plaintiff's witnesses testified that the platform, as stated 
in the deed, was 10 feet wide on its westerly edge and 
that the 10 foot platform extended along the north edge 
of the Colorado Animal By-Products Company Building 
to the east side of the west door where it widened out 
approximately to the spur track. The trial court believed 
the respondent's witnesses, made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law accordingly, and entered a decree 
limiting the defendants' use of the plaintiff's property 
for purposes of a platform to the area covered by the 
original lumber structure. The trial court did not believe 
that the reservations and grants in the deeds gave the 
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appellants the right to use all of the plaintiff's property 
as a right of way and linrited them to the use of the area 
south of the spur track for roadway purposes. The 
findings and decree as to these two points are assailed 
by the appellants. There are no issues in the case as to 
the right of the appellants to use the spur track nor the 
right to maintain the roof over the platform. 
ARGUMENT 
':rhe points relied upon by the appellants will be dis-
cussed in order: 
Point A. 
It is contended that the court erred in denying the 
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The 
appellants urge that the reply introduced a new and dif-
ferent cause of action; that the issues were framed by 
the several answers and replies ; and that the complaint 
went entirely out of the law suit. A few cases are cited 
to sustain the proposition that the character of a law suit 
may not be changed and a new cause of action introduced. 
Neither the proposition urged or the cases cited are in 
point. As observed in the statement of the case, the 
complaint was not one merely to quiet title but included 
a specific allegation that the defendants had wrongfully 
constructed a concrete ramp upon the plain tiff's land 
without his consent; they were asserting and claiming 
the right to use it, and that unless required to remove 
it the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury. The 
prayer is for a decree quieting title as against the claims 
asserted by the defendants, and for a decree requiring 
removal of the concrete ?~amp and restrainin.q the de-
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fendants from using the plaintiff's property. (Abs. 2-4.) 
When the defendants denied the allegations as to the 
ownership of the plaintiff's property and the wrongful-
ness of the use and maintenance of the ramp, issues of 
fact were framed. This will become apparent upon an 
examination of the complaint, and the allegations con-
tained in paragraphs numbers two, three, four, five 
and six of the answer of Seymour N. Bailey and wife. 
(Abs. 5-8.) Similar allegations appear in the answers 
of the other appealing defendants. As a further defense 
the defendants refer to the reservations in the two deeds 
dated in 1923, and allege that the loading platforms and 
roadways were open, visible and apparent when the prop-
erty comprising lots 2 and 3 was divided. It is alleged in 
paragraph eight of the Seymour Bailey answer (and sim-
ilar allegations appear in all of the other answers) that 
the plaintiff enlarged and extended a platform attached 
to his warehouse which unlawfully interferes with the 
defendants' free use of their easements. (Abs. 14-15.) 
The prayer is that the defendants' title be quieted as to 
their easements and right of ways and that. the plaintiff 
be required to remove the pia tform so enlarged. This is 
obviously a counterclaim, although not designated as such. 
The replies to the several answers are substantially the 
same. The affirmative allegations in the answers to the 
effect that the defendants had the right to use the plain-
tiff's land for roadway purposes and to use the ramp as 
at present constituted are denied. It is admitted that the 
deeds containing the reservations were executed but all 
of the allegations as to the meaning and construction of 
the deeds are denied. 
Apparently the defendants take the position that 
10 
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when the plaintiff admitted that in 1923 a lumber pJat.,. 
form approximately 10 feet wide and 75 feet long stood 
on his property and alleged that a concrete ramp covering 
a much larger area was constructed in 1932, there was a 
departure from the cause of action stated in the com-
plaint. This contention is without merit for the reason 
that the charge is made in the compJaint that the defend-
ants wrongfully and without the consent of the plaintiff 
constructed and are using the very colfiAcrete ramp, and 
assert and claim the right to use it. Issues of fact are 
also raised by the pleadings as to the right to use all of 
the plaintiff's property as a right of way, and as to the 
right of plaintiff to enlarge his own lumber loading plat-
form. 
It is elementary that if the pleadings present mate-
rial issues of fact, the motion for judgment on the plead-
ings must be denied. 
49 C. J. 670, Sec. 948 ; 
Miller v. White, 258 P. 565; 
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23; 
Mapleton v. Kelley, 39 Utah 252, 117 P. 52. 
If the motion is made by the defendants it may be 
treated as a general demurrer and be governed by the 
rules applicable thereto. 
Coburn v. Bartholomew, 50 Utah 566, 167 P. 
1156. 
It is not even argued that the complaint does not state a 
cause of action. The only argument is that the replies 
11 
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state a new cause of action and as shown above this is 
without merit. 
Neve v. Allen, 55 Kan. 638, 41 P. 966. 
Furthermore, if they did, this point could not be raised 
by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
Mills v. Hart, 24 Colo. 505, 52 P. 680; 
Wilson v. Jones, 67 Okla. 6, 168 P. 194. 
The replies are not inconsistent with the complaint. The 
complaint says that the defendants have without the con-
sent of the plaintiff constructed and maintained upon his 
property a large concrete ramp and the replies merely 
deny affirmative allegations that the defendants have 
certain easements over the plaintiff's property including 
the right to maintain and use the ramp and narrow the 
issues somewhat by admitting that the defendants have 
the right to maintain a smaller lumber platform. There is 
nothlng unusual about the pleadings. If counsel's posi-
tion is sound the pleader in drafting his complaint would 
have to anticipate just what easements or interests in the 
property the defendant will claim and negative them in 
the con1plaint. The trial court very properly denied the 
motion. 
Point B. 
It is next contended that the trial court erred in mak-
ing findings of fact which confine the defendants' ease-
ments to the use of the property south of the spur track 
and to the use and maintenance of a platform covering 
12 
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the same area as it covered in 1923 at the time of the sev-
erance of Lots 2 and 3. At the outset, on page 24 of their 
brief it should be noted that the appellants admit that 
''their rights are determined by the deeds and the grants 
or reservations therein contained and they can neither 
detract from nor add to the rights therein granted and 
reserved." It should also be noted that the appellants 
do not refer to the specific property conveyed by the 
deeds, but attempt to give the impression that all of the 
property ever owned by Seymour or Bert Bailey or by 
Bailey & Sons is benefited by every grant or reservation. 
Let us analyze the deeds : 
The deed from Seymour to Bert Bailey dated August 
9, 1923, described only the property now owned by the 
plaintiff. It will be noted that it expressly states that the 
reservations of the right to the use of the trackage and 
to the team truck ·or auto drive along the track are for the 
benefit of Lot 2 for the loading and unloading of mer-
chandise. There is nothing said about which side of the 
track the team truck or auto drive was on. The evidence 
indicates that at one time a team, truck and auto drive 
along the north side of the track was used for the bene-
fit, not of Lot 2, but Lot 3, as a means of ingress and 
egress to and from the warehouse now owned by the 
plaintiff and, an old hay barn. The hay barn burned 
down in 1918 and the road fell into disuse. As observed 
by appellants, the old concrete road is now covered with 
gravel. The roadway along the track used for loading and 
unloading in 1923 was the one along the south .side of the 
tracks by means of which trucks and wagons loaded and 
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unloaded merchandise upon and from the lumber loading 
platform .. As shown by the attached diagram, the load-
ing platform in the rear of the properties involved in this 
appeal, which the court found was only 10 feet wide and 
was quite a distance from the old roadway north of the 
tracks which led at one time to the hay barn and to the 
warehouse, but the roadway to the south of the tracks 
was located adjacent to the lumber platform and was 
used for loading and unloading merchandise. The deed 
refers to only one roadway and the parties obviously had 
reference to the road south of the tracks. The deeds them-
selves, and the evidence as to the relative location of the 
platform and the spur track are sufficient to support the 
findings of the trial court. 
The reference to the "north line thereof" found in 
the deed to Bailey & Sons Company is relied upon to in-
dicate that the team, truck and auto drive was on the 
north side of the track. Counsel does not point out that 
this g'rant of a right of way is for the benefit only of the 
lot in the Southwest corner of Lot 2 now owned by Sum-
merhays. The argument is deceptive in that it attempts 
to impress the reader that the deed to Bailey & Sons 
Company described, in connection with this grant, all of 
the property in Lot 2. It is significant that the property 
to be benefited is in the southwest corner of Lot 2. The 
old road to the hay barn and the warehouse would be of 
no benefit to the lot so situated, but the roadway south of 
the track between the track and the old lumber platform 
would be the one vital to the needs of the occupant of the 
Summerhays property and the only one used. Further-
14 
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more a reading of the entire deed from the abstract, Ex-
hibit J. Entry 50, (not from the excerpts quoted by ap-
pellant) will indicate clearly that the reference to the 
''north line thereof'' means the north line of ''said Lot'' 
meaning Lot ~. It described the railroad spur and auto 
drive as both being along the north line of the lot through 
and over a part of the south lj2 of Lot 3. If the deed had 
conveyed, the Scowcroft property located some distance 
east, there may have been some merit to counsels' con-
tention, but there is none, with reference to the Summer-
hays property or any other property. Again we reiterate 
that the grant in the Bailey & 8 ons Company deed is the 
only one that mentions (JIYty north line, and it specifically 
described the Summerhays prope'rty and that only as the 
dominant estate. 
The grant is not as counsel contends for the benefit of 
all of Lot 2. 
Under Point B counsel repeatedly refers to the words 
"and to the premises" which it is claimed should be in-
cluded in the description of the easements reserved in 
the Seymour Bailey-Bert Bailey deed. It is claimed that 
those words intended to reserve a right of way over all of 
plaintiff's property. As pointed out the words do not ap-
pear in the abstract of the deed, Entry 37, Exhibit J. 
The trial court has as much right to base its finding 
upon the description in Exhibit J as it would have had to 
base it upon the abstract, Exhibit X, or upon any other 
abstract. Under the circumstances the finding of the 
trial court should not be disturbed. 
Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P. 526; 
James v. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, ~67 P. 827. 
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Point C. 
The appellants contend that the findirugs of fact, con-
clusions of law and decree as to the location and dimen-
sions of the loading platfonn described in the deeds are 
not supported by the evidence. Before discussing the tes-
timony of the various witnesses, let us reexamine the 
reservation in the deeds with respect to the loading plat-
form. In the deed from Seymour to Bert Bailey (Exhibit 
J, Entry 37) it will be noted that the platform is de-
scribed as follows: 
"About 10 feet wide including the overlapping 
roof for said platform including also the curve there-
of along the railway spur as at present constntcted 
with full right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the 
same within its- present location." (Italics ours.) 
It is admitted by appellants as observed above that: 
"The parties are bound and their rights are de-
termined by the deeds and grants and the reserva-
tions therein contained and they can neither detract 
from nor add to the rights therein contained." 
(App. Br. 24.) 
Yet they immediately forsake this proposition and 
contend that the trial court erred in finding and decreeing 
that the rights of appellants were determined by the 
deeds. They would have this court believe that the express 
limitations to the effect that a platform "about 10 feet 
wide'' could be maintained and used "as at present con-
structed" and could be rebuilt "within its present loca-
tion," are meaningless and that the defendants could 
properly construct a concrete ramp upon the plaintiff's 
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property which is, in its widest place, more than five 
times the width of the orig·inal lun1ber platform. It is 
claimed that since the appellants had a right of way over 
the area south of the tracks to drive to and from the 
loading platform, they had a right to grade it and surface 
it and that was all they were doing when they constructed 
the ramp over the entire southwest corner of the plain-
tiff's property covering fifty-six feet of his frontage, 
without his knowledge and consent. Such an argument 
clearly does violence to the express limitations in the 
deeds of the right to maintain the platform ''as at pres-
ent constructed" and in "its ,present location." 
Testimony was offered by both plaintiff and defend-
ant as to the size and location of the platform. The de-
fendants' witnesses testified that the west edge of the 
platform was 32 feet wide and that it covered nearly the 
same area as is covered by the concrete ramp. A sharp 
conflict arose as to whether the west edge of the lumber 
platform was 32 feet wide or 10 feet wide. The court 
found that at the time of the severance of the property 
now owned by the plaintiff, from the appellants' prop-
erty, the lumber loading platform covered the following 
described land : 
"Beginning at a point 7.3 feet East of the South-
west corner of Lot 3, Block 43, Plat 'A,' Salt Lake 
City Survey; thence North 10.7 feet; thence East 34 
Feet; thence North 14.6 feet; thence South approx-
imately 70 degrees East 61.2 feet following the curve 
of the Oregon Short Line Tracks and on the South 
side thereof; thence South 5.0 feet to the south side 
of said Lot 3; thence West 91.7 feet to point of be-
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ginning. Also steps to said platform extending 7 
feet west and 5 feet North from the Southwest cor-
ner of .said platform.'' (Finding of Fact No. 13, 
Abs. 149.) 
This finding is assailed as unsupported by the evidence 
and it is even contended that the description was supplied 
de hors the record by someone after the case was tried 
and submitted. This contention is entirely groundless. 
The following evidence supports the finding as to the size 
and location of the lumber platform as it existed August 
9, 1923. 
Testimony of Joseph F. Merrill is that the location 
and size of the platform was, as .shown by the map, Ex-
hibit L, and by the insurance company maps, Exhibits M 
and N. It will be noted that the very dimensions speci-
fied in finding No. 13 appear on the map, Exhibit L. 
(Abs. 84, 85-Tr. 166, 167.) 
Testimony of Arnold Evans that in 1926 he was em-
ployed at the warehouse now occupied by the Colorado 
Animal By-Products Company, but then occupied by 
the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company. He describes the 
platform as follows : 
'' Q. Will you describe the platform at the rear 
of the building when you went there~ 
A·. Well, there was a platform extending out 
from the building, I would say about 10 feet with 
steps leading from the third west side up to the plat-
form to the first door, if I remember correctly. 
After that it extended out almost to the spur track. 
Q. On which side of the first door was the ex-
tension' 
A. I think on the east side.'' ( Tr. 328.) 
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:Mr. Evans indicated the locations of the two doors in the 
north of the warehouse with a red pencil. (See Exhibit 
R.) 
Eugene H. Merrill measured the distance from the 
west side of the west door which is the first do-or referred 
to by Mr. E:vans and found it to be 36 feet. (Abs. 135, 136, 
Tr. 233.) He found the width of the west door to be 6 
feet and the distance fron1 the north side of the building 
to the widest point of the wooden platform which is lo-
cated on the property at present and whicli the testimony 
shows was not changed when the concrete ramp was con-
structed to be 23 feet. The distance from the west side of 
the building to the sidewalk at the northwest corner was 
found to be 6.7 feet. There is no contention made by ap-
pellants that the location of the building now occupied by 
Colorado Animal By-Products Company or the location 
of the west door has been changed during the last 20 
years. 
Mr. Evans testified also that Exhibits P, Q and R, the 
first two being railroad rna ps of the Oregon Short Line 
and the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroads and the 
latter being a drawing made by E. H. :Merrill from other 
maps fairly represent the platform as it was in 1926. 
(Abs. 123-128.) The Oregon: Short Line map shows the 
dimensions of the platfonn to be the same as described 
in the findings and decree. The witness also testified that 
the area indicated in red pencil innnediately north of the 
Colorado Animal By-Products Company warehouse shows 
the additions made by the Kelly-Springfield Tire Com-
pany in 1926. ( Abs. 125.) 
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Willard Snow who also worked at the Kelly-Spring-
field warehouse in 1926 described the platform as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Will you describe the platform as it was 
when you went there~ 
A. You mean the one just directly north of the 
building. That was about-there was some steps 
leading up to this platform, almost at the corner of 
the building, up to this platform. This platform was 
about, I imagine around ten, maybe eleven feet wide, 
and then from this main platform there was another 
little ramp, probably oh, maybe, five feet, maybe, 
leading up to the west door. 
Q. And on the east what was the platform~ 
A. The east? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There was a ramp directly from the west 
door at right angles right out to the tracks that had 
just been built by the company when I entered their 
employ. It was new construction. 
Q. That is, by the Kelly-Springfield Tire Com-
pany~ 
A. Yes, by the Kel1y-Springfield Tire Com-
pany. 
Q. Now, describe that platform or ramp~ 
A. The platform ran at right angles from the 
west door directly out to the spur track, and it was 
probably, maybe six feet wide. 
Q~ And about how long~ 
A. You mean from the building Y 
Q. F:rom the building out to the track Y 
A. About twenty-five or thirty feet. 
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Q. Then what was immediately east of the new 
rampf 
A. Well, the old ramp that connected with this 
ramp that the Kelly-Springfield Tire Company built, 
it went off east and followed the spur track around 
over to the end of Bailey's building. 
Q. It followed the curve of the track 1 
A. It followed the curve of the track, yes .. 
Q. About how far did that extend north from 
the building at the widest point¥ 
A. vVell, about the same as that Kelly-Spring-
field platform. That hit pretty close to the center, I 
believe, or right at the east edge of the Kelly-Spring-
field ramp that went out, which was about twenty-
five or thirty feet." {Tr. 355, 356-Abs. 131.) 
When Mr. Snow was shown the map, Exhibit P, which 
shows the same dimensions of the platform as appear in 
the findings and decree and he was asked whether it was 
a fair representation of the platform in 1926, he said, 
"that looks just like it to me." (Tr. 359, Abs. 132.) 
The testimony of the two disintersted witnesses, Evans 
and Snow, as to the size and location of the platform was 
definite and clear, and it is submitted that this testimony 
together with the actual measurements made by E. H. 
Merrill amply support the findings as to the size and loca-
tion of the old platform. The right of the appellants to 
maintain and use a platform on the plaintiff's property is 
limited by the deed to the location of the old platform and 
the finding as to the location of the old lumber platform 
is supported by substantial and conclusive evidence. The 
testimony of Evans and Snow is not adequately ab-
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stracted. It may be found in the transcript, pages 327 to 
376. 
The map attached to Exhibit 0, a public document of 
the Public Service Commission of Utah, show.s the plat-
form as described by plaintiff's witnesses. 
The evidence supports the specific findings as to the 
dimensions of the original lumber platform without ref-
erence to any of the maps introduced for illustrative pur-
poses. It may be briefly summarized: 
"7.3 feet East of the Southwest corner of Lot 3 
Block 43, Plat' A,' Salt Lake City Survey." 
William I. Richards, a witness called by the defendants 
testified that the distance was 7 feet 8 inches. (Abs. 106.) 
The discrepancy between this testimony and the starting 
point in the decree is four inches and it is in favor of the 
defendants so they cannot complain. \Vitnesses Ryser 
and Richards, both called by the defendants, testified 
that the marks on the building shown on the photographs, 
Exhibits 1, 3, and 6, particularly Exhibit 6 show where 
the western edge of the old lumber platform was located 
and also show where the steps were. The building is on 
the property line and it will be noticed that by 0ounting 
the bricks between the corner of the building marked 
Colorado Animal By-Products Company, to the mark 
which the defendants' witnesses testified was even with 
the western edge of the pia tform that there are 10lj2 
bricks. Each brick, as is commonly known, is 8 inches 
long and the combined width of the mortar would be ap-
pr-oximately 4 inches or a little less than lf2 inch between 
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two bricks. The total distance then from the corner of 
the building to the edge of the platform would be 88 inches 
or 7-1/3 feet. 
Thence North 10.7 Feet 
The width of the original lumber platform at its west-
ern most edge "Tas said to be between 10 and 11 feet by 
the following witnesses : 
Joseph F. Merrill. (Abs. 84.) 
Taylor Merrill. (Abs. 87.) 
Arnold Evans. ( Abs. 124.) 
Willard Snow. (Abs. 131, 132.) 
Any discrepancy amounts only to a fraction of a foot and 
the finding should not be disturbed. These are the wit-
nesses the trial court chose to believe. 
Thence East 34 Feet. 
Eugene H. Merrill made measurements of the distance 
between the Northwest corner of the Colorado Animal 
By-Products Building and the west side of the West door 
and found the distance to be 36 feet and the width of the 
door to be six feet. (Abs. 135, 136.) Both Arnold Evans 
and Willard Snow testified that the 10 foot lumber plat-
form extended east along the building to the east side of 
the west door and that it then jogged to the north extend-
ing out to within 18 or 20 inches of the railroad track. 
(Abs. 124-131, 132-135.) The platform .starts 7.3 feet east 
of the northwest corner of the building. By mathematical 
computation, it will be found that the platfonn extended 
east 34.7 feet before it jogged to the north. The discrep-
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Thence North 14.6 Feet. 
The evidence shows that the location of the spur track 
has not been changed since 1923 and that the Colorado 
Animal By-Products Company warehouse is in the same 
location as it was before 1923. (Abs. 89, 90.) The map, 
Exhibit A, prepared by E'. H. Merrill, an engineer and 
duly authenticated accurately .shows the location of the 
spur track and the building to which the lumber plat-
form was attached. (Abs. 78-80.) By the use of a meas-
ure, it will be found that the distance from the building 
at a point 42 feet east of the Northwest corner of the 
building to a point 20 inches south of the railroad track is 
25.3 feet. The platform was 10 feet 7 inches wide so the 
distance of the jog to the north would be 14.6 feet. Fur-
thermore, Willard Snow testified that it was about 25 or 
30 feet from the west door of the warehouse to the track. 
(Abs. 132, 135.) Arnold Evans testified to the same ef-
fect. 
Thence South Approximately 70 Degrees Eas~t 61.2 Fol-
lowing the Curve of the Oregon Short Lin1e Tracks and 
on the South Side Thereof. 
The testimony of the defendants' witnesses, Ryser 
and Richards, is to the effect that the rear part of the 
platform follows the curve of the track as it did before 
the concrete was installed. (Abs. 93, 94, 106, 108, 109, 111, 
Exhibits 4, 5.) The tracks have not been moved so there-
fore the angles, directions and distances could be and 
were taken from the map prepared by E. H. Merrill, Ex-
hibit A. The angle and distance south and east following 
the curve of the Oregon Short Line Track ·was con1put.ed 
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from Exhibit A which shows the easterly part of the plat-
form as it was in 1923 and as it is at present. (Exhibit 5, 
Abs. 93.) "'\Vitnesses called by the defendants, William I. 
Richards and M. A. Jensen testified that except for en-
larging the clearance between the platform where it 
curves along the track and the spur track, the outside 
boundaries of the platform were never changed between 
1910 and 1933. ( Abs. 113, 123.) 
Thence South 5 feet to the 8outh Side of Lot 3. 
This dimension is the same now as it was in 1923 and 
the measurement is taken from the map, Exhibit A. (Ex-
hibit 5, Abs. 93.) 
Thence West 91.7 Feet More or Less to Point of Begin-
ning. 
This, is the closing line of the description and is taken 
from the map, Exhibit A, which shows the building and 
the eastern end of the platform as it is now and as it has 
been since 1923 and before. 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the fore-
going counsel's argument on page 42 of appellants' brief 
that: 
''The court may search the record from end to 
end and it will not find any testimony of any such 
dimensions, or that the platform was of the size so 
described in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree,'' 
is clearly without merit. It is also charged that these 
courses and distances could only be taken from the vari-
ous maps which were introduced for illustrative purposes. 
It is highly significant that whether the maps have any 
value, in connection with the oral testimony, as substan-
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tive evidence or not, they are obtained from many sepa-
rate sources; they show the platform as described in the 
findings, as it was before the concrete structure was put 
in and they are all the .same. Not one shows the western 
extremity of the platform to be 32 feet wide. It is also 
significant that the appellants have been unable to pro-
duce a single map or photograph which sustains their 
position. 
It is argued in the appellants' brief over several pages 
that the reference in the deed to a platform 10 feet wide 
described the easterly end of the platform with a curve 
to the north along the spur track. This argument is ab-
surd for the reason that if the platform was ever 10 feet 
wide at the easterly end, it would have extended well 
past the middle of the railroad tracks. See Exhibit A. 
No one contends that the railroad tracks have ever been 
moved. 
This court has declared many times that although in 
equity cases it may review conflicting evidence to deter-
mine whether findings of the trial court are supported it 
has repeatedly held that the findings will not be disturbed 
unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
This rule is well stated in the recent case of Stanley vs. 
Stanley, 94 P. (2d) 465, as follows: 
"The scope of review on appeal in equity cases 
is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'This court is 
authorized by the state constitution to review the 
findings of the trial courts in equity cases but the 
findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence 
will not be .set aside unless it manifestly appears that 
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the court has misapplied proven facts or made find-
ings clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315. '' 
See also: 
Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712; 
Singleton v. Kelley, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63; 
Holmanv. Christens'On, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457; 
Zuniga v. Eivans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. (2d) 513; 
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P. (2d) 1; 
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 94 Utah 
134, 76 P. (2d) 234. 
It is also settled that it is the exclusive province of 
the trial judge to pass on the credibility of witnesses and 
the weight of the evidence. The rule is stated as follows 
in the case of Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P. 
526: 
''Nor can the assignment he sustained that the 
court's findings are contrary to or not supported by 
the evidence. On some of the material facts the 
statements of plaintiff and his witnesses are in direct 
conflict with the statements of the defendant and his 
witnesses. It was the exclusive province of the trial 
court to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight to be given to their statements. There 
is some substantial evidence in support of every es-
sential finding made by the court, and in view of 
that we cannot interfere with the court's findings." 
See also James v. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, 167 P. 827. 
The law as to the right of the owner of the dominant 
estate to materially change or enlarge the servitude upon 
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the servient estate is well stated in the case of Stephens 
Ranch Company v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528 at page 
535, 161 P. 459, thus: 
''The law is further well settled that when one 
acquires lands which are burdened with such an ease-
ment or prescriptive right he takes them subject to 
such right, but he is not also bound to submit to a 
material change or enlargement of the right by the 
dominant owner if thereby the servient estate is in-
jured to a larger extent than it was under the right as 
it existed when the servient estate was acquired. It 
is not necessary to cite or review a large number of 
cases upon this point. See Creeley Irr. Co. v. Van 
Trotha, 48 Colo. 12, 108 P. 985; Manier v. Myers 
and Johns, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 514; S. C. 45 Ky. 
(6 B. Mon.) 132; Schumacher v. Brand, 72 Wash. 
543, 130 P. 1145; " 
See also: 
17 Am. Jur. 98, and cases there cited. 
The structures or roadways on the servient estate 
which are used in the enjoyment of the easement cannot 
be materially altered without the consent of the owner 
of the servient property. The following is a g·ood state-
ment of the rule : 
''As a general rule when the character of an 
easement is once fixed, no material alterations can 
be made in physical conditions which are essential to 
the proper enjoyment of the easement except by 
agreement. This applies to both the owner of the 
easement and the owner of the fee. The test is to 
determine the right to make a particular alteration 
is whether the alteration is .so substantial as to re-
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suit in the creation and substitution of a different 
servitude from that which previously existed. It is 
no defense in an action involving such an alteration 
that the mode and n1anner of using the easement will 
be less burdensome to the servient estate, and n1ore 
convenient to the owner of the dominant lands.'' 17 
An1. Jr. 1006. 
The extent to which a court of equity will go to con-
fine the servitude to that part of the .servient estate 
which is reserved for a right of way by deed, is well il-
lustrated in the leading California case, Winslow v. Val-
lejo, 148 Cal. 723, 84 P. 191, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851. In 
that case the deed did not definitely describe the area sub-
ject to a right of way for the laying of water pipes. In 
granting an injunction against the city and restraining it 
from enlarging the servitude, the court said: 
"In Jennison v. "\Valker, 11 Gray, 423, the court 
said: 'Where an easement in land is granted in gen-
eral terms, without giving definite location and de-
scription to it, so that the part of the land over 
which the right is to be exercised, cannot be definite-
ly ascertained, the grantee does not thereby acquire 
a right to use the servient estate without limitation 
as to the place or mode in which the easement is to 
be enjoyed. When the right granted has been once 
exercised in a fixed and defined course, with the full 
acquiescence and consent of both parties, it cannot be 
changed at the pleasure of the grantee.' 
This case involved the location and course of an 
aqueduct. The same principle has been applied to the 
construction of a dam (Evangelical Lutheran Orphan 
Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic Asso.) (64 N. Y.) 561; 
and to the location of a right of way. \Vynkoop v. 
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Burger, 12 Johns 222; Bannon v. Angier, 2 .Allen 
128 · 0 'Brien v. Goodrich, 177 Mass. 32, 58 N. E. 151; 
' . Garraty v. Duffy, 7 R. I. 476. We think, therefore, 
that the construction given to the conveyance by the 
lower court was correct, and that the laying of the 
10-inch pipe, with the acquiescence of both parties, 
measured and limited the location and the extent of 
the easement. 'It is elementary that the location of 
an easement of this character cannot be changed by 
either party without the other's consent after it has 
once been finally established, whether by the ex-
press terms of a grant, or by acts of the parties 
tantamount in their effect.' Vestal v. Young, 147 
Cal. 715,82 P. 381; Allen v. San Jose Land & Water 
Co., 92 Cal. 138, 15 L. R. A. 93, 28 P. 215. If the de-
fendant had no right to lay the new pipe, injunction 
was the proper remedy. 'It is the settled law of this 
state that, irrespective of other damage, an injunc-
tion will be granted to prohibit the continuance of ac-
tion that obstructs one in the free use and enjoyment 
of his land, where such action, if continued, will ripen 
into an easement.' Vestal v. Young, supra, and cases 
cited." 
There can be no doubt but that the effect of construct-
ing the concrete ramp across the front of plaintiff's prop-
erty not only violated the terms of the deed but very sub-
stantially and materially enlarged the servitude. Upon 
an examination of the photographs, Exhibits 1-6 and 
B-H inclusive, and of the map, Exhibit A, it will be 
apparent that the concrete ramp covers more than two-
thirds of plaintiff's frontage. It is bound on the north by 
a concrete retaining wall one foot thick and it is so con-
structed as to make the ramp and the entire area covered 
usable only by the occupants of the appellants' premises. 
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The deed does not give the beneficiaries the exclusive 
right to use the roadway to and from the loading plat-
form and when the loading platform was only about 10 
feet wide to a distance of 42 feet from the west property 
line, the area now covered by the concrete ramp could be 
readily used by both the owner of the dominant and servi-
ent estates. Furthermore, prospective purchasers of 
plaintiff's property, as it is encumbered by the great 
concrete ramp readily observe that they can buy no front-
age whatever. If the plaintiff had permitted the ramp to 
remain as it is without objection for the prescriptive 
period his property would have become burdened with an 
easement to maintain a concrete ramp for the exclJwsive 
benefit of the dominant estate, covering nearly all the 
frontage, which very .substantially decreases its value. It 
is idle to argue that such wrongful appropriation of the 
plaintiff's property did not inerease the burden and did 
not materially change the nature of the servitude. To sus-
tain this unlawful aet of the appellants would destroy in 
a measure the sacred right of a pro,perty owner to . de-
termine just how and by whom his land may be used. It 
is submitted that the findings of the trial court as to the 
location of the original lumber platform and as to the con-
crete ramp and parts of the decree requiring the removal 
of that portion of the ra1np which extends beyond the 
area occupied by the original platform are all amply sus-
tained by the evidence and by the law. 
Point D. 
Counsel admits that there is no statutory support for 
the argument that the trial court erred in failing to give 
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the defendants any ·opportunity to be heard upon objec-
tions and proposed amendments, and in not ruling upon 
the objections. The rule quoted by the appellants as one 
promulgated by the Third District Court provides that 
the judge may designate the time for argument and set-
tle the same, etc. It will be noted that this is discretionary 
with the judge. The objections were submitted as sug-
gestions to aid the court in making its finding and decree. 
The trial judge is not required to let counsel orally argue 
them, and when he .signed the findings and decree he, of 
course, ruled adversely to the appellants' contentions. 
The cases cited by appellants to support their contention 
in this regard are not in point. They relate to situations 
where the court failed to make findings on material is-
sues and failed to rule upon plaintiff's motion to strike 
parts of the pleadings. It is .submitted that this conten-
tion is wholly without merit. 
Point E. 
In view of the full disclosure in the preceding pages 
of the source of the evidence which support the findings 
of fact and decree with reference to the dimensions of the 
platform as it was in 1923, the argument under Point E 
is entirely beside the point. As noted above the findings 
do not rest upon courses and distances in maps intro-
duced only for illustrative purposes, but rest upon the 
testimony of witnesses and upon the map, Exhibit A pre-
pared by a practicing engineer which shows the location 
of structures ·on the ground which have not been altered 
since prior to 1923. The appellants had full opportun-
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ity to cross-examine E. H. Merrill, who prepared the map, 
Exhibit A, and as far as the record discloses no inac-
curacies as to the location of the concrete ramp, the spur 
track, the building now occupied by the Colorado Animal 
By-Products Company, or the other buildings and prop-
erty lines have been found . .A:s pointed out above the find-
ings are sustained in part by the testimony of the appel-
lants' own witnesses, Ryser, Richards and Jensen. 
The reference in the appellants' brief to the questions 
asked of one of the attorneys for the respondent at the 
time the motion for a new trial was presented (Abs. 179-
182) is not accurate. Upon a reading of all of the ques-
tions and answers, it will be noted that Mr. E. J. Skeen 
said: 
"Well, I think E.ugene Merrill took a tape meas-
ure and went down ~nd rechecked the measurements 
that he had made on his original map am.d which is 
in evidence, and which also appears in the railroad 
maps and the insurance maps in evidence." (Abs. 
179.) 
The question as to whether Eugene Merrill did or did not, 
in an abundance of precaution recheck courses and dis-
tances (no one know.s what courses and what distances) 
has nothing whatever to do with this case. The question 
is whether the description of the old platform contained 
in the deed and decree is supported by the evidence, and 
as we have painstakingly pointed out every course and 
every distance is amply supported by evidence, properly 
authenticated and received, much of it offered by the 
appellants themselves. The various railroad and insnr-
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ance maps were properly received in connection with te• • .; 
timony that they show the platform as it was before the 
concrete was installed. 
All of the assignments of error relied upon by the 
appellants are without merit, and the decree of the dis-
trict court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. D. SKE·EN and 
E. J. SKEEN, 
.Attorneys for Respondent. 
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